


# Key exchange



Basic idea:

hardness of computing:  $g^{ab}$ , given only

$$A = g^a, B = g^b \quad g^{a+b} = AB$$

$$A^b = g^{ab}$$

Protocol:

$$a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$


$$A = g^a$$

$$K = H(B^a)$$

↓  
compute using

K as shared secret

sees A, B



$$B^a = A^b = g^{ab}$$

$$b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$B = g^b$$

$$K = H(A^b)$$

A sees, A, B, and by assumption cannot compute  $g^{ab}$

$$\text{Dlog: } \forall A, \Pr \left[ \begin{matrix} X \in G \\ x \leftarrow A(X) : g^x = X \end{matrix} \right] = \text{negl}$$

$$\text{CDH: } \forall A, \Pr \left[ \begin{matrix} a \in \mathbb{Z}_p \\ b \in \mathbb{Z}_p \\ C \leftarrow A(g^a, g^b) : C = g^{ab} \end{matrix} \right] = \text{negl}$$

Diffie Hellman triple

Computational  
Diffie Hellman


$$\text{DDH: } \approx_c \left\{ \begin{matrix} a \in \mathbb{Z}_p \\ b \in \mathbb{Z}_p \\ C \in G \end{matrix} : (g^a, g^b, C) \right\}$$

A, B, C


Decisional  
Diffie Hellman

$$A(A, B) \stackrel{?}{=} C$$

## Oblivious Transfer



Simple OT



Semi-Honest      Simulatability

- Protect Alice from Bob

$\forall m_0, m_1, b, \exists S_B$  for  $\text{View}_B$

$\text{Sim}_B(b, m_0)$

$\approx_c$

$\text{View}_B[A(m_0, m_1) \leftrightarrow B(b)]$

- Protect Bob from Alice

$\forall m_0, m_1, b, \exists S_A$  for  $\text{View}_A$

$\text{Sim}_A(m_0, m_1)$

$\approx_c$

$\text{View}_A[A(m_0, m_1) \leftrightarrow B(b)]$